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Malicious actors in cyberspace are gaining increasingly sophisticated tools,
techniques, and procedures that are outpacing security solutions. Organized
criminals and state-sponsored groups now have ample resources to disrupt
or breach conventional defenses. Underground hacker markets provide them
with ready access to a plethora of products and services.1 Attackers often
rent large botnets or use similar attack tool kits. For instance, the
intelligence firm Crowdstrike recently found twelve malicious groups in
China using the same exploit codes within 24 to 72 hours of each other.2 In
many cases, malicious attempts to obtain valuable, sensitive data are not
isolated, but part of multi-year campaigns. For their victims, the costs of a
successful attack can add up in professional services, lost opportunities, and
downtime, plus reputation damage, to almost a million dollars.3 Targeted
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organizations need a holistic view of the threat landscape and a proactive
security posture to defend against the multitude of threats. Knowing the
who, what, where, how, and when of a malicious activity is the only way to
decrease its chance of success. Cyber threat intelligence provides knowledge
of a malicious actor’s capabilities, infrastructure, motives, goals, and
resources in cyberspace. The use of this intelligence enables an organization
to prioritize defenses around prized assets, focusing on vulnerabilities and
ways that an adversary activity can be mitigated.4
Cyber attacks may be part of coordinated campaigns that simultaneously
target related organizations by sector, whether industry or commercial. Based
on actual attacks observed during 2014 by the cyber security company Risk
Analytics, 75 percent of attacks spread from Victim 0 to Victim 1 within one
day, while over 40 percent hit the second organization in less than an hour. A
sense of urgency exists to share what is known about attacks, because the faster
and more broadly various types of cyber threat intelligence are shared, the
more other organizations can theoretically stop similar attacks.5 Recipient
organizations can leverage cyber threat intelligence in the form of cyber threat
information and indicators across various cyber attack vectors in support of
improved data analytics and layered security controls. Cyber threat intelligence
allows an organization to stay ahead of a malicious actor. The visibility it
provides lets an affected organization understand the tradecraft of
sophisticated attackers and make informed decisions to better protect from
targeted assaults.
CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE CONFIGURATIONS
Threat intelligence is formed through information gathered from disparate
sources synthesized by human analysts to identify a specific threat to a
specific target. The discipline of intelligence fuses any combination of
human intelligence (HUMINT)—the collection of information from
human sources; open source intelligence (OSINT)—the exploitation of
public information via data mining; signals intelligence (SIGINT)—the
collection of signals transmitted by communications systems; imagery
intelligence (IMINT)—the use of images from terrestrial, airborne, or
satell ite collectors; and measurement and signature intell igence
(MASINT)—the use of information gathered by technical instruments.6
Cyber threat intelligence applies broader principles of intelligence which
include the collection of information from many sources, context-aware
analysis, intelligence production, and delivery to consumers. The
intelligence cycle consists of planning and direction for intelligence
gathering; the collection of potentially useful raw data from relevant
sources; the processing of collected data into a standardized format for
detailed analysis; the analysis of processed data to identify threats to
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customers and suitable countermeasures; and the dissemination of the
analysis in the context of cyber threat information and indicators to
consumers so that appropriate protective measures can be taken.7
The idea behind cyber threat intelligence is to provide the ability to recognize
and act upon relevant threats in a timely manner. Effective cyber threat
intelligence exhibits the characteristics of being actionable. That means it
should ideally identify actions the recipient can take to counter a threat or
provide an adequate context to develop a suitable response. To counter a fast
moving cyber assault, the intelligence products should be delivered within
minutes or seconds. In dealing with a more deliberate attack, the intelligence
may still be useful if hours, days, or even months old. Whenever and however
it arrives, cyber threat intelligence should be relevant to an organization. It
should address threats the organization is likely to face, attacks it is likely
to experience, and describe the malicious elements the recipient is likely to
encounter. Intelligence should be accurate, meaning correct, complete, and
unambiguous.8 Cyber threat intelligence is constructed and delivered in the
context of cyber threat information or indicators. Among its many forms are
annual or quarterly threat reports (such as in PDF or Word documents),
vendor blogs, email alerts, and data feeds by structured file formats. Overall,
cyber threat intelligence products should be demonstrably useful to the defense
of organizational assets. For example, threat indicators that increase detection
capability and provide early warning of attack are of the most immediate value.
Threat indicators can be classified as either indicators of compromise or
indicators of attack. Indicators of compromise are typically the presence of
malware, signatures, exploits, vulnerabilities, and Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses. Indicators of attack may signal that an attack is underway, such
as in code execution, persistence, stealth, command and control, and
lateral movement within a network. A combination of indicator of attack
analysis with indicator of compromise protection can address the full range
of attacks.9 Organizations rely on multiple data feeds for aggregation and
analysis. They accept and consolidate technical data through their security
information and event management (SIEM) and intrusion prevention
system (IPS) platforms. This data consists of specific attacker attributes
and granular indicators, like malware samples or vulnerability information.
Other examples of useful data are command and control channels or
destination IP addresses. Cyber threat intelligence products help defenders
detect attacks during, and ideally before, stages of an attack, by providing
indicators of actions taken during every stage. For instance, security alerts
and logs provide visibility on access creation, configuration modifications,
and database events, while other reported indicators include remote logins
from atypical countries, access outside of hours, and changes to privileged
accounts.10 With sound data, security teams can more readily look for
indicators and patterns of malicious activity.
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Intelligence Sources
Anorganization can leverage cyber threat intelligence from internal, commercial,
or community sources. Internally, organizations collect and develop intelligence
from resident capabilities. In some cases, an organization can find signs that an
attack may occur in the future, for example, throughWeb server log entries that
show the usage of a vulnerability scanner. More common is the detection of
indicators of attack, like a network intrusion detection sensor that alerts when
a buffer overflow attack attempt occurs against a database server, or of
compromise, like antivirus software that alerts when it detects that a host is
infected with malware. Other internal indicators are file integrity checking
software, network flow sensors, and operating system, service, and application
logs, which record which accounts were accessed and what actions were
performed. Similar in function are network device logs from firewalls and
routers which log blocked connection attempts.11 The challenge is sorting and
internally sifting through thousands or even millions of indicators a day to
find the real security incidents that have occurred. This process is
time-consuming, labor-intensive, and potentially error-prone.
Organizations can turn to commercial sources for cyber threat intelligence to
reduce processing time and cut labor costs. They can find free cyber threat
intelligence services on Internet-accessible outlets that distribute indicators
of compromise, malware, and blacklist information. For example, Google’s
VirusTotal is a free online service that analyzes suspicious files and URLs
(Web addresses like http://www.example.com/) to facilitate the quick
detection of viruses, worms, Trojans, and all kinds of malware. VirusTotal
also runs a blog site for the latest information on malware execution and
URL parameters.12 Likewise, some leading cyber security firms freely release
news and analysis on their blogs, among them Unit 42 at Palo Alto
Networks.13 Still, information from open sources has to be manually
collected and analyzed, so many organizations choose to obtain fused cyber
threat intelligence from a commercial provider. A wide range of providers is
available from which to choose. Many vendors supply data to support their
technologies, and others provide data that is interoperable with corporate
systems.14 For instance, McAfee supplies cloud-based real-time global threat
intelligence for McAfee products at no charge.15 Likewise, Palo Alto
Networks’ cloud-based malware analysis WildFire environment offers
protection from unknown threats (malware, exploits, command and control)
through native integration with their Enterprise Security Platform.16 In turn,
LookingGlass provides multi-source, Internet-intelligence-based Virus
Tracker data feeds that connect to corporate security infrastructure with an
easy-to-use API (Application Program Interface).17
Organizations can also obtain cyber threat intelligence from a sharing
community structured around such industry sectors as financial, electricity,
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or health. One type of sharing community arrangement is the Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). The concept of an ISAC was
introduced and promulgated pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive-63
(PPD-63), signed by President Bill Clinton on 22 May 1998. PPD-63
directed the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection,
and Counter-Terrorism to consult with critical infrastructure owners and
operators to encourage the creation of a private sector Information
Sharing and Analysis Center. The Center could serve as a mechanism to
not only gather, analyze, sanitize, and disseminate private sector
information to both industry and the government, but also to distribute to
the private sector government-produced threat information. Critical to the
success of such an institution is its timeliness, accessibility, coordination,
flexibility, utility, and acceptability.18 Today, twenty ISACs exist to
analyze and share timely, relevant, and actionable cyber security
information as it pertains to threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents. ISACs
also share security-best practices and empower resiliency through security
planning and disaster response. Most ISACs have 24=7 threat warning and
incident reporting capabilities.19 ISACs reach deep into their sectors to
provide trusted and secure information and analytical capabilities to
communities, as they relate to aviation, communications, maritime, oil and
natural gas, real estate, retail, transportation, and water.20
Another type of sharing community arrangement is the Information
Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO). At his Cybersecurity Summit
at Stanford University in February 2015, President Barack Obama signed
a new Executive Order to encourage companies and industries to set up
ISAOs to share threat information with each other. The Order promotes
information sharing about cyber threats, both within the private sector and
between government and the private sector.21 ISAOs may be organized on
the basis of sector, region, or other affinity, with membership drawn
from the public or private sectors, or a combination of both. The Order
calls for a common set of voluntary standards for baseline capabilities that
ISAOs should possess. The standards address operating procedures,
technical means, and privacy protections, such as minimization.22 The
National Council of ISACs is working collaboratively with its partners in
implementing the Executive Order, although whether the new standards
will apply to sector ISACs is not clear. Nonetheless, the National Council
of ISACs remains engaged in many key industry segments that have been
experiencing cyber attacks, often working with the National Cybersecurity
and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) during incidents.23 The
new Order also directs the NCCIC to engage in continuous coordination
with the ISAOs on the sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks
and incidents.
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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for protecting
U.S. critical infrastructure from physical and cyber threats. Inside the
DHS resides the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Center (NCCIC), which serves as a central location where a diverse set of
partners involved in cyber security coordinate and synchronize their
efforts. Thirteen federal departments and agencies and sixteen private
sector entities have regular, dedicated liaisons at the Center, while over 100
private sector entities collaborate with the Center on a routine basis. The
NCCIC analyzes cyber security information, shares timely and actionable
threat information, and coordinates response, mitigation, and recovery
efforts.24 Its Operations and Integration Branch plans, coordinates, and
integrates capabilities to synchronize analysis, information sharing, and
incident management efforts. The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness
Team is the NCCIC’s 24-hour operational arm. The Team distributes
vulnerability and threat information through its National Cyber Awareness
System, which offers mailing lists for alerts on issues, bulletins on
vulnerabilities, tips for the general public, and current security activity.
The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center will
partner with the new Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC)
to protect national networks. This center will help the Department of
Homeland Security better understand various cyber threats by providing
targeted Intelligence Community support.25 President Obama directed the
Director of National Intelligence in February 2015 to establish the CTIIC.
The purpose of the Center is to provide integrated all-source intelligence
analysis related to foreign cyber threats and cyber incidents affecting U.S.
national interests. The CTIIC will not directly engage with the country’s
private sector entities to provide, receive, or obtain any information about
cyber threats; instead, it will support the NCCIC in its mission.26 Modeled
after the National Counter-terrorism Center, the CTTIC will not collect
intelligence, but will analyze and integrate information already collected
under existing authorities to fill gaps between existing agencies.27 However,
even with significant responsibilities, the Center will not be allowed to fill
more than 50 permanent positions, though it will be located in a building
owned or operated by an element of the Intelligence Community.28
Voluntary Programs
The Department of Homeland Security conducts a variety of voluntary
information sharing programs. The Cyber Information Sharing and
Collaboration Program (CISCP) establishes a community of trust between
the federal government and entities from critical infrastructure sectors. The
program shares cyber threat, incident, and vulnerability information in
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near-real time, and enhances collaboration to improve network defense for
the entire community. To join CISCP, partners such as the Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers and the stakeholder community, sign a
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement, which provides access
to the NCCIC Watch Floor and clearances up to the TS=SCI level. CISCP
participants submit threat indicators to the Department of Homeland
Security, which can be shared with other participants in an anonymized,
aggregated fashion. Upon receiving a submission, program analysts redact
any personal or proprietary information and analyze the submission in
collaboration with both government and industry. Any provided data
classified as Protected Critical Infrastructure Information is protected by
statute, exempting it from both release and regulatory use. Program
analysts produce accurate, relevant, timely, and actionable analytical
products that take the form of Indicator, Analysis, and Alert Bulletins and
of Recommended Best Practices.29
Another voluntary information sharing program run by the Department of
Homeland Security is the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) program.
This program is an enhanced approach to protect and defend U.S. based
public and private entities by supplementing commercial services and
capabilities with government threat information. The ECS program shares
sensitive and classified government-vetted cyber threat information with
qualified and cleared private sector cyber security Commercial Service
Providers (CSPs) and also Operational Implementers (OIs). The CSPs use
the cyber threat information to better protect their customers, while OIs
use the information to protect their internal networks. Once vetted, CSPs
and OIs enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of
Homeland Security to receive government furnished threat indicators. The
indicators range in classification from Unclassified to Top Secret=SCI. The
CSPs, such as AT&T, Century Link, Verizon, and Lockheed Martin, use
the indicators to deliver Enhanced Cybersecurity Services to U.S.-based
public and private entities through commercial relationships. The
Enhanced Cybersecurity Services augment, not replace, existing cyber
security capabilities operated by the entities.30
SHARING COORDINATION CHALLENGES
While obvious benefits exist in the sharing of cyber threat information,
myriad coordination challenges must be considered. The first is the risk of
disclosure of protective or detective capabilities and of sensitive
information, such as personally identifiable information, intellectual
property, trade secrets, or other proprietary information that can result in
financial loss, legal action, or reputation damage. The second is the
classification of information which might be difficult to actually use and
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expensive to request andmaintain clearances for access. The third is trust in the
use of the information, which can be time consuming to create and maintain.
Next is the ability to consume the information through the infrastructure
necessary to access external sources and to incorporate the information into
the process for actual decisions. Fifth is the challenge of establishing
interoperability for the secure, automated exchange of data among
organizations, repositories, and tools. Ideally, the exchange would be
through agreed upon formats and protocols. Finally, throughout the entire
process of sharing information, is the challenge of preserving privacy of
both individuals and organizations that may participate in sharing
communities, but want their contributions to remain anonymous. Numerous
technical initiatives and legal precedents are in the works or have been
approved to remedy many of these coordination challenges.31
Sharing Legislation
After years of failed attempts to enact cybersecurity legislation, Congress passed
the ‘‘Cybersecurity Act of 2015’’ on 18 December 2015 as part of an emergency
budget omnibus bill. The Act is very similar to the ‘‘Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (CISA),’’ which passed the Senate on 27 October 2015. President
Obama signed the spending bill, enacting a $1.1 trillion budget and the Act
with it. Title I of the Act, titled Cybersecurity Information Sharing, mandates
the establishment of capabilities and procedures to facilitate and promote the
timely sharing of cyber threat indicators, in addition to defensive measures
between federal entities and non-federal entities. The procedures will require
both entities, prior to sharing a cyber threat indicator, to remove personal
information about a specific individual or information that identifies a
specific individual not directly related to a cybersecurity threat. The Act
provides an antitrust exemption, allowing two or more private entities to
exchange or provide a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure relating to
the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of a cybersecurity threat. It also
provides protection from liability, such that ‘‘no cause of action shall lie or
be maintained in any court against any private entity’’ for the monitoring of
an information system and for the sharing or receipt of a cyber threat
indicator or defensive measure.32
Passage of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 required an intense sprint of
negotiations. Privacy advocates say those late-night, closed-door negotiations
removed hard-won protections. One major complaint is that cyber threat
information will henceforth be shared directly with the National Security
Agency. The original bill, CISA, was meant to allow companies to share
information with other companies and the Department of Homeland
Security, which would then filter it. Likewise, the purposes allowed under the
negotiated bill for the government to disseminate data are criticized as being
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too broad. The allowed information is to be used to combat criminal activity,
rather than being used for only cybersecurity.33 Also, the final version of the
enacted legislation calls on companies to remove information they ‘‘know’’
to be personal; earlier versions used the term they ‘‘reasonably believe.’’34
Hill staffers acknowledged that the final bill wasn’t the most pro-privacy
version put forward, but it was the version that could pass Congress. To no
surprise, a bipartisan group of privacy-minded and civil liberties-focused
lawmakers sponsored a bill in January 2016 to repeal the Cybersecurity Act
of 2015. Although the leader of the group, Representative Justin Amash
(R-Michigan), called the beleaguered Act ‘‘the worst anti-privacy law since
the USA Patriot Act,’’35 proponents argue that the enacted legislation was
sorely needed to thwart the cyber attacks plaguing the public and private
sectors.
Automated Mechanisms
Cyber threat intelligence should be shared in as close to real time as possible in
order to block sequential attacks. Given this mandate, the Cybersecurity Act
of 2015 imposed a 90-day deadline for the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the heads of appropriate Federal entities, to develop and
implement a capability and process to commence real time, automated
sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. The Department
responded with deployment of their new Automated Indicator Sharing
(AIS) system, which provides the capability for the timely exchange of
relevant and actionable cyber threat indicators among federal departments
and agencies and the private sector.36 In this case, an indicator is defined as
an observable, identified fact, plus a hypothesis about a threat. The goal of
the AIS initiative is to enable the NCCIC to receive indicators from the
private sector, remove unnecessary personally identifiable information, and
disseminate the indicators. By design, the AIS initiative alleviates many
challenges to sharing coordination. Specifically, it anonymizes the identity
of the submitter, unless the submitter has consented to sharing its identity;
minimizes the amount of data collected; retains information for a limited
amount of time; and ensures that any collected information is used
explicitly for authorized governmental purposes.37
Through the Automated Indicator Sharing effort, the DHS is building
upon work already accomplished and adopted to the fullest extent
possible, to include use of TAXII (Trusted Automated eXchange of
Indicator Information) and STIX (Structured Threat Information
eXchange) as core enabling technologies. TAXII is a means to send
automated threat indicator messages, and STIX is a language to
communicate those messages. TAXII defines a set of services and message
exchanges that, when put in place, facilitates the sharing of actionable
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cyber threat information across organizational, product line, and service
boundaries. TAXII is not itself an information sharing program and does
not establish trust agreements, governance, or other non-technical facets of
collaboration. Instead, TAXII helps organizations share selected
information with the partners they choose. STIX is a collective effort to
develop a standardized, structured language to characterize cyber threat
information. The STIX framework aims to express the full range of
potential cyber threat data elements. International in scope and free for
public use, TAXII and STIX are community-driven technical specifications
designed to permit automated information sharing for situational
awareness, real-time network defense, and sophisticated threat analysis.38
IMPROVEMENTS LOOMING
The premise of sharing cyber threat intelligence is that attackers use the same
tools and techniques on similar targets. In response, peer organizations can
leverage observed and fused cyber threat information and indicators to
identify and prevent subsequent attacks. Research by the Ponemon Institute
indicates that 39 percent of attacks could be thwarted by threat intelligence
sharing.39 For example, the inclusion of external threat feeds into internal
security platforms enhances behavioral (of system changes) and baseline (of
abnormal events) anomaly detection methods.40 However, the creation of
an effective defense against advanced threats hinges not only on being able
to detect intruders, but doing so in time to prevent damage to operations or
assets. Therefore, the timely sharing of relevant and actionable cyber threat
intelligence, in the context of cyber threat information and indicators, is
imperative to reducing the impact of attacks. Organizations in the United
States can turn to commercial sources or join sharing communities for
various forms of cyber threat intelligence. The past three years have
featured an explosion in new security firms offering cyber threat intelligence
in the United States. Organizations have an array of commercial options
when seeking to select an approach that combines quality and value.41 They
can also join a sector-based Information Sharing and Analysis Center or
Organization, for which the latter structure is meant to extend information
sharing across a region or in response to a specific, emerging threat.42
In the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security has directed the
accelerated deployment of technologies, guidance, and partnerships to
enhance the Department’s role in the cybersecurity of the government and
the nation. Secretary Jeh Johnson recognized that ‘‘information sharing is
fundamental to achieving our mission.’’43 He expected that, in the near
future, the Automated Indicator Sharing initiative would provide the
capability to automate the distribution and receipt of cyber threat
indicators. Improved Intelligence Community support to the resident
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National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center will come
from the fledgling Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, enabling
the ability to share more information with private sector partners. Still,
challenges exist in sharing information between and among the private
sector, particularly in privacy and trust. Although companies now have
liability protection from new congressional legislation, their customers will
not be notified that their data is being examined, and that data will be
spread broadly across a thin patchwork of government IT systems,44
vulnerable to intrusion, as seen in the breach of the Office of Personnel
Management.45 Yet, in regard to the ability to ‘‘share relevant information
more quickly’’ and in a manner that ‘‘protects the privacy rights of all
Americans,’’ President Obama’s cybersecurity coordinator, Michael Daniel,
maintained: ‘‘These two things are not mutually exclusive—we can achieve
both of those goals.’’46 To hear an optimistic view on enacting the
fundamental precept of cyber threat intelligence sharing is encouraging.
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